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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The independence of judges is... requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of the individuals ....
- Alexander Hamilton (Federalist No. 78)
INTRODUCrION: "THE CITADEL OF PUBiC JuSTICE AND SECURITY"
In contemporary America one can scarcely imagine a federal judge forced
to choose between revoking one of her decisions at the whim of the President
or Congress, or imprisonment. However, such circumstances once existed. In
the early seventeenth century, two historic figures2 sparked a dramatic debate
that still influences American society.3 Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, one of
King James I's supporters, asserted the King's omnipotence over the English
court and metaphorically stated "Rex est lex loquens."' England's Chief Jus-
tice, Sir Edward Coke, bravely retaliated that the King could not sit in the
place of England's judges.' Specifically, Coke replied to his sovereign, "that
the King should not be under man, but under God and law.' On that day in
history, a fledgling judiciary lost its bid for autonomy as James I threatened to
cast Coke into the Tower of London if he did not cease challenging the
King.
7
Fortunately, neither the United States Congress nor the President bran-
dishes the same degree of control over the federal judiciary that James I
wielded over England's courts. However, the American political system does
not escape the controversy surrounding the amount of power afforded the
federal courts. Increasingly, unpopular decisions have led to calls for greater
political control over the judiciary.' The issue of judicial independence gained
1. THE FEDsLRUST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. James I of England, son of Mary Queen of Scots, born June, 19, 1566, reigned over
England from 1567 until 1625. CLARA & HARDY STEELHOLM, JAMES I. OF ENGLAND 15, 25
(1938). Sir Edward Coke, born in 1550, later served as England's Chief Justice until his indefinite
suspension in 1615. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE, 387-88 (1957);
CUTHBERT WILJAM JOHNSON, THE LIFE OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 328 (1845).
3. On November 13, 1608, James I started this debate by claiming that "all the Judges of
England and Barons of the Exchequer" were "his shadows and ministers... and the King may, if
he please, sit and judge in Westminster Hall in any Court there and call their Judgements in ques-
tion." BERNARD ScHwARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1993).
4. "The King is the law speaking." STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDN, LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (2d ed. 1989).
5. Coke believed that the judgment of the law required study and experience before a per-
son could understand its application. ScHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Id. at 4.
7. lId
8. Charles Levendosky, Religious Right Targets Justices for Impeachment over Amendment
2, DENVER POST, Oct. 16, 1996, at B7 (quoting National Legal Foundation president Steven
Fitschen announcing "the Romer six, the six Supreme Court justices who declared Amendment 2
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prominence in our society as an interested public sought to understand and
articulate the scope of this autonomy.
This article provides the background for the discussion-with several
judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit-that fol-
lows.9 It does not seek to determine whether the federal court system has ob-
tained an unequivocal amount of autonomy in order to be considered "inde-
pendent." Nor does it attempt to attack or defend the concept of judicial inde-
pendence."
I. ORIGINS AND MECHANISMS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Article M of the United States Constitution preserves the independence of
judges in their decision making process." Article m courts are not complete-
ly detached from political machinations; rather, their autonomy depends upon
the actions of the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment, the achievements of the courts themselves in gaining power over their
sister branches, and the courts' credibility in the eyes of the judged. For the
purposes of this paper, the most applicable definition presumes that judicial
unconstitutional, must be impeached"). The six justices whose impeachment Fitschen demanded
are Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O'Connor,
John P. Stevens, and Stephen G. Breyer. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623-25 (holding that
the Colorado Constitutional Amendment prohibiting governmental protection for gay and lesbian
individuals violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and William Rehnquist were excluded from this call, having dissented in
Romer v. Evans. Id.
9. This article discusses judicial independence only as it applies to the federal courts.
10. Compare Charles Levendosky, Editorial, Impeach Six Justices? Really?, NEws AND OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 11, 1996, at A23 (disapproving of some groups' calls for the Romer
Six's impeachment); L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to Mercer Law Review Symposium on Feder-
al Judicial Independence, 46 MERCER. L. REv. 637, 638 (1995) (considering judicial indepen-
dence the "cornerstone of a free society and the rule of law"); W.F. Rylaardsam, Judicial Indepen-
dence-A Value Worth Protecting, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653 (1993) (arguing for judicial indepen-
dence in the wake of the Rodney King decision); with Owen M. Fiss, The Limits of Judicial Inde-
pendence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 57, 66-67 (1993) (arguing for some limitation on
judicial independence); Arnold Beichman, Available Armament for Judicial Restraint, WASH.
TIMES, May 14, 1996, at A13 (describing the different control mechanisms over the judiciary).
11. See, e.g. James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 795-96 (1995) (stating that judicial independence originates from the separation of powers
model found in the United States Constitution); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 349, 351 (1993) (arguing that judicial independence exists as a multi-layered relation-
al system between the judges and electorate, as well as within the judiciary itself); Roger
Handberg, Judicial Accountability and Independence: Balancing Incompatibles?, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 127, 130 (1994) (stating that "[Jiudicial independence refers to the notion that judges may
have physical and emotional space to render impartial decisions, without fear of retribution (either
formal or informal) for unpopular, yet sound, decisions"). Id. Mecham, supra note 10, at 638
(defining judicial independence as "a judge's ability to decide a case free from pressures or in-
ducements. Judicial independence has an institutional character, which is best seen in our consti-
tutional separation of powers. It has an individual character, which is partially protected by the
Constitution in the provisions for life tenure and the guarantee of no diminution of salary, but
which extends further to encompass those conditions in which and under which a judge decides
the case ...."). Id.
12. Mecham, supra note 10, at 638 (quoting a memorandum dated April 22, 1994, from
Judge Jane R. Roth on the Third Circuit to Steven M. Tevlowitz, Counsel to the Committee on
the Judicial Branch).
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autonomy is not an end in itself, but an essential piece of the separation of
powers doctrine, while encompassing other factors which encroach upon judi-
cial decision making.
I1. THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
There are two constitutional sources of federal judicial independence:
Article III and the Due Process Clause. These provisions work together to
both legitimate and limit the measure of independence that Article III courts
enjoy.
A. The Constitution
The United States Constitution provides several textual protections of
judicial independence. Article I expressly vests "the judicial power" in the
judicial branch of government. 3 Under a formalist/originalist paradigm of the
separation of powers, no branch may exercise authority that the Constitution
has not delegated to it. 4 Under this model, branch authority is confined by
the parameters of the Constitution, and is curbed by the implied power of
checks and balances established by the Framers.'- Formally, then, judicial
power is preserved simply because it has not been delegated to the other
branches.
By contrast, the functionalist model of the separation of powers doctrine
posits a willingness to ignore definitional restraints on branch power in light
of the demands of the social and political context. 6 Under this theory, judi-
cial power remains conceptually separate, but greater potential exists for the
other branches to usurp that authority.
History confirms the Framers' intention to establish and maintain a dis-
tinct and independent judiciary. As Justice Brennan concluded in Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., "[Olur Constitution unambiguously
enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the United
States' must be reposed in an independent judiciary. It commands that the
independence of the judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear insti-
tutional protections for that independence."'" The judiciary derives its distinc-
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
14. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspec-
tives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 709 (1995). In his concurrence to a seminal opinion, Justice Jack-
son stated: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
15. "The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite
Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of
one branch at the expense of the other." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 57-58 (1982) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam)).
16. Redish, supra note 14, at 711.
17. 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982). Montesquieu stated as well, "[There is no liberty, if the power
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." Jordan Fried, Student
Essay, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission: An Analysis of the Role of the
Judiciary, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 704, 723 n. 117 (1989) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
1997]
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tion as an independent branch under a separation of powers framework.
B. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and and Fourteenth Amendments
secure an individual's right to life, liberty and property.'8 "None of the core
values of due process... can be fulfilled without the participation of an inde-
pendent adjudicator."' 9 In other words, the procedural safeguards of due pro-
cess which attempt to assure accuracy and fair procedure-notice, hearing,
counsel, transcript, and confrontation-are unattainable without a neutral and
detached decision-maker.
Judicial independence is a prerequisite to fair procedure and is the essence
of procedural due process. ° A court must be independent, because "no judge
can be fair and impartial if he must answer to another branch for his judicial
decisions. ';  This proposition certainly implies, at the very least, that pro-
cedural due process exists for the benefit of the judged.'
IIL FORMAL METHODS OF CONTROL
As there is no shortage of commentary on the subject of judicial indepen-
dence, an in-depth examination of all mechanisms of control falls outside the
scope of this discussion.' Thus this article analyzes only those controls that
most affect judicial decision-making. A discussion of appointment, tenure and
compensation, impeachment, and jurisdiction explores their genesis within the
Constitution and the impact of their control on the judicial branch.
LAws).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V & amend. XIV, § 1. The essential elements of the adversary pro-
cess that may be required as part of due process include: 1) sufficient notice of the charges or the
basis for state action, 2) an impartial and detached decision-maker, 3) an opportunity to present
the case to the ultimate decision-maker, 4) an occasion to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, 5) the right to an attorney and 6) a fair decision founded on the evidentiary record,
including the reasons for the decision. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW § 13.8 at 548 (5th ed. 1995).
19. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455, 476 (1986).
20. Redish & Marshall, supra note 19, at 475-91.
21. United States v. Mitchell, 37 MJ. 903, 906 (N-M.C.M.R. 1993). The court further stated,
"[t]he right to have one's case heard before a fair and impartial judicial body as a matter of con-
stitutional due process is firmly established in the law." Id.
22. "Mhe provisions for securing the independence of the judiciary were not created for the
benefit of the judges, but for the benefit of the judged." Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and
the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. Cn. L. REv. 665, 698 (1969).
23. For a discussion of the other checks not discussed in this article, see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (discussing the inconspicuous mechanisms that
control judicial decision-making); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:





Possibly the most striking intrusion on judicial autonomy involves the
appointment process of federal judges. United States Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter once described the procedure as "that odd lottery where men
get picked for the Supreme Court.""2 Nonetheless, it provides insight to the
consequences of checks and balances on the Judicial branch.
One of the President's most significant powers is the ability to appoint
Justices to the United States Supreme Court.' It is well-recognized that the
appointment power influences the political direction of the Supreme Court.26
The Framers, however, imposed a restraint on the President's appointment
power by mandating the consent of the Senate. Thus, unlike other formal
controls, the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice integrates the political
convictions of a tripartite system of government.
Additionally, although the public only indirectly impacts the decision-
making process, its political interest in judicial appointments is evident. Media
coverage of Clarence Thomas' nomination to the Supreme Court, following
closely on the heels of the Senate rejection of Robert Bork, heightened public
interest and debate.'
Political motivations clearly influence these appointments. One can hardly
imagine the process without the active involvement of interest groups." As
the record suggests, the appointment process makes it highly unlikely that Su-
preme Court justices will deviate too sharply, or for too long, from the ambi-
tions or priorities of those with political power.0 The function of the Senate
cannot be disregarded either, for its power to advise and consent may affect
the composition of the Court in two ways. First, it may influence the President
to refrain from the pursuit of highly controversial appointees. Second, the
Senate may refuse to confirm presidential appointees for reasons of ideology,
corruption, or incompetence.'
24. Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1146, 1149 (1988) (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, Of Law and Life and Other Things That
Matter, 135 (P. Kurland. ed. 1967).
25. U.S. CONST. art I1, § 2, cl. 2.
26. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUsTICES AND PRESIDENTS 5-7 (3d ed. 1992).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
28. See generally Anton Bell, Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21 N.C. CENT. LJ.
194 (1995) (describing Clarence Thomas' confirmation); Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How
the Tempting of America Led the People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759
(1991) (describing Bork's confirmation hearing and rejection).
29. JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 36 (1995)
(providing an excellent review of various appointments from 1881 through the present involving
the active participation of interest groups).
30. Cf, ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 41-82 (noting that political ideology is not the only
consideration in the appointment process and that region, race, gender and religion of the appoint-
ee may often influence the President's decision).
31. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985) (noting
that in this century until 1985, Supreme Court nominees have been rejected on only three occa-
sions-President Nixon's appointments of Judges Haynesworth and Carswell, and President
Hoover's appointment of Judge John Parker). Rejection of President Reagan's nomination of
Judge Bork brings the total to four. Carter, supra note 28. However, one commentator argued that
the United States federal courts were "de facto" racially exclusionary from 1789 to 1949. A. Leon
19971
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It might appear that the power and process of appointment have little to
do with the judicial branch as an entity of the federal government. In fact, the
Framers declined to articulate any criteria for the selection of the judiciary.
Furthermore, not only has the Supreme Court declined to offer constitutional
guidance on qualifications, but its nominees are not even required to be law-
yers. 2 Instead, it appears that as time passes qualifications become implied.
The judiciary as an entity is rarely, if ever, directly involved in the ap-
pointment of its peers. Instead, it is the independence the potential appointee
can bring to the bench that is of concern. Nowhere else in this discussion does
the judge, as an individual, play such a meaningful role. For in the appoint-
ment power, which primarily rests in the Legislative and Executive branches,
the institutional Court is a passive collective voice. The Justice, by contrast,
retains discrete liberty.
B. Tenure and Compensation
The institutional safeguards of life tenure and permanent salary protection
are critical to the constitutional structure which ensures separation of pow-
ers.33 In setting these requirements, the Framers intended to build a govern-
ment comprised of separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches. As
early as in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the impor-
tance of tenure and irreducible salary protection in maintaining judicial inde-
pendence.' Hamilton and the other Federalists believed that requiring legisla-
Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in the Judicial Systems: The American Experience and the
South African Challenge, 42 DuKE L. J. 1028, 1035 (1993).
32. ABRAHAM supra note 26, at 49; See also Higginbotham, supra note 31, at 1051. For a
comprehensive examination of the absence of criteria for Supreme Court candidates, see Mario
Perez-Reilly & John R. Vile, The U.S. Constitution and Judicial Qualifications: A Curious Omis-
sion, 74 JUDICATuRE 198 (1991) (quoting a joke related by Benjamin Franklin wherein he notes
the Scottish practice, "in which the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected
the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among themselves.")
(citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoN 'v EMoN OF 1787, 120 (Max Farand ed.) (1937)).
In contrast to the absence of criteria for selection of the judiciary in Article IMI the Framers
established explicit requirements in Articles I and U1 for securing the offices of the President, sena-
tors and representatives.
33. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not he diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Life tenure
and a guaranteed salary are considered essential attributes of an Article m judge and the strongest
link to an independent federal judiciary. Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article
111 Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 CoLum. L. REv.
1758, 1758 (1984). This commentator argued that the language of Article M demonstrates the
Framers careful deliberation about guaranteeing judicial independence. Id. at 1765. See United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (reviewing an action challenging Congress' power to reduce
cost-of-living increases previously authorized by statute); see also Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of
America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[a) separate
and independent judiciary, and the guarantees that assure it, are present constitutional necessities,
not relics of antique ideas").
34. Curtis, supra note 33, at 1767 (citing THE FEDERALST Nos. 78 & 79 (Alexander Ham-
ilton)). Hamilton wrote that "[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judges, than a fixed provision for their support .... In the general course of
human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." THE FEDER-
AUsST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted); see also Steve W. Gold, Note, Temporary
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ive or executive enforcement of the Article I provisions would frustrate the
purpose of judicial independence.35
The Constitution presents a separate and seemingly contradictory provi-
sion. In Article II, the Constitution conferred to the Executive branch the pow-
er to make interim judicial appointments.' A "recess appointee," however,
receives neither life tenure nor protection against salary diminution. 7 Al-
though such an appointee is subject to greater political pressure than a judge
whose nomination has been confirmed by the Senate, the President's power to
appoint in these positions is limited: 1) it may only be invoked while the Sen-
ate is in recess, and 2) recess commissions expire at the end of the next con-
gressional session."
The Supreme Court has stressed that the constitutional safeguards remain
necessary to judicial independence.39 However, the judicial recess appointee
who, like Article l judges, has sworn to uphold the Constitution, fills a void
and allows the perpetual functioning of the judicial system. The recess ap-
pointee, therefore, is not a threat to the autonomy of the judiciary at ajl; in-
stead, it is an "extraordinary exception to the prescriptions of Article 1H."
The guarantees of Article II guarantees secure independence from legis-
lative and executive persuasion while they promote public confidence in the
judiciary, lure qualified jurists to the bench, and insulate judges from influence
by their peers.4' Ultimately, these constitutional protections serve as a shield
and a sword for the judiciary, and perhaps provide the greatest tangible securi-
ty for its perpetual independence.
C. Impeachment
If appointment is idiosyncratic, the impeachment of a federal judge is
nothing short of dramatic, as seen in the classic question from the President
Criminal Immunity for Federal Judges: A Constitutional Requirement, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 699,
714 (1987) (alleging that judicial life tenure is the buttress of the Framer's theory of judicial inde-
pendence; this supports the implication that removal of a judge through any method other than
impeachment is constitutionally unfounded).
35. Hatter v. United States, 953 F.2d 626, 628-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
64 F.3d 647, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the opinion that the insulation of the judi-
ciary from the political departments also enhances judicial independence within the judicial branch
itself, see Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 136-37 (1970) (Douglas, J. dissenting);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts
Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L. J. 297, 302-03 (1981).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 provides that "[t]he President shall have the Power to fill
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session." Id.
37. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985).
38. U.S. CONST. art. H, §2, cl. 3.
39. Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) ("In sum, our
Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the
United States' must be reposed in an independent judiciary. It commands that the independence of
the judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protection for that indepen-
dence.").
40. Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1014 (recognizing that the power to appoint a recess appointee
rests in the Constitution itself, and thus, cannot be rewritten even if the provision is unwise).
41. In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Pro Tempore to a respondent judge---"[how say you: is the respondent guilty
or not guilty?"'42 Recently, Congressional use of the impeachment process has
escalated. For instance, until 1986 thirteen impeachments passed from the
House and were forwarded for trial to the Senate.43 Of that number, only four
impeachments involved federal judges." This situation changed in the 1980's,
however, when three federal judges were "impeached, tried, and removed" in
three years."'
The text of the United States Constitution establishes the procedure' and
sanctions47 for judicial impeachment.' Further, these provisions offer, as a
guarantee, the sole mechanism for removing Article Ill judges from office. '
The purpose of this guarantee is to shield the judge "from improper influences
not only by other branches but by colleagues as well," in order to maintain
judicial autonomy and individualism.' Procedurally, impeachment is cumber-
some, and requires a majority vote by the House of Representatives and a
Senate conviction by a two-thirds super-majority vote."
Commentators have argued that the impeachment process is inefficient.
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson described the impeachment process as a "bungling
way of removing Judges,"'2  equating its effectiveness to that of a
42. MARY L. VOL..CANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEA MENT: NONE CALLED FOR JusTIcE 1 (1993).
43. Id. Interestingly, although congressional use of impeachment is increasing, the ratio of
house impeachment investigations to the number of federal judges is decreasing. Warren S.
Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as the Exclusive Removal Mecha-
nism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REv. 209, 1215 (1991).
44. VoirANsEK, supra note 42, at 1.
45. Id. The three recent federal judges impeached include: Harry Clairborne of the District of
Nevada, Alcee Hastings of the Southern District of Florida, and Walter Nixon of the Southern
District of Mississippi. li at 1-2; Melissa H. Maxman, Note, In Defense of the Constitution's
Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH. L. REv. 420, 420-24 (1987) (examining the use of
impeachment and other mechanisms for removing federal judges).
46. The House of Representatives "shall have the sole power of impeachment" U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 5. The Senate "shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of
two-thirds of the Members present." Id. art. I, § 3, cl.6.
47. The only sanction against an impeached judge is removal from "the office of Honor,
Trust, or Profit, under the United States." Id. art.I, § 3, cl. 7. Furthermore, a judge is still "liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment according to Law." Id.
48. 'The President, Vice-President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be re-
moved from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
49. Courts have determined the scope of application of the protections afforded under Article
Ell. See generally Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (declaring
an act unconstitutional that confers federal judicial powers on bankruptcy judges, but fails to con-
fer Article In protection to such judges); Geras v. Lafayette Fixtures, Inc. 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that Article III protection does not apply to United States Magistrates).
Different removal procedures for Article I and Article IV judges are governed by statute.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53 (identifying the removal procedures for an Article I bankruptcy
judge by citing 28 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 377, n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (discussing the removal procedures for an Article IV territorial judge by citing Am. Samoa
Code § 3.1001)).
50. NOWAK & ROTuNDA, supra note 18, §2.8; see also, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrriUONAL LAW 64 n.7, § 3-6 (1988) (citing Kurland, supra note 22).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5-6.
52. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 295 (1922).
[Vol. 74:2
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scarecrow.53 Admittedly, the most frequent modem challenge to the impeach-
ment process is its inefficacy,54 as each hearing "monopolizes weeks of limit-
ed Congressional session time."" For example, a 1986 impeachment lasted
three months from House approval to final conviction.56 Several incorrect
assumptions, however, weaken the inefficiency argument. First, statistical data
indicates that impeachments are uncommon. For instance, although three im-
peachments occurred in the 1980's, the sheer volume of Congressional im-
peachment investigations has decreased over the last fifty years. In fact, the
likelihood of a judicial impeachment investigation initiated by Congress re-
mains at only two inquiries for every one hundred judges appointed. The
unwieldy impeachment process protects federal judges from the political rami-
fications of their decisions.59 Thus, were the impeachment process to become
manageable, judges would receive less protection from politically unpopular
decisions.
Although impeachment is the exclusive method of judicial removal, judges
remain susceptible to other pressures.' For instance, the court in Hastings v.
Judicial Conference of the United States6' discussed the "certification" pro-
cess whereby a judicial council initially receives an investigating committee's
report on judicial misconduct.' If the Council determines that the judge "en-
gaged in conduct which might constitute... grounds for impeachment under
[A]rticle I of the Constitution... "' it forwards the certified determination to
the Judicial Conference of the United States.' After making its own determi-
nation, the Conference forwards the information to the House of Representa-
tives to conclude whether impeachment is appropriate.'
In general, the impeachment process serves two functions: it limits judi-
cial authority and insulates judges from negative reactions to unpopular deci-
sions. As burdensome as this process is on the legislative branch, it acts as a
breaker against the tides of popular discontent. Congress' reluctance to provide
53. Id.
54. Maxman, supra note 45, at 423.
55. Id. at 447.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Grimes, supra note 43, at 215.
58. Id. This ratio is thirty times lower than the ratio of impeachment investigations of federal
judges in the first fifty years of the Constitution's existence. Id. As of 1990, 829 federal judges sit
throughout United States courts. Id.
59. Maxman, supra note 45, at 440.
60. In addition to the mechanisms mentioned in this paper, the American Bar Association
has promulgated a Model Code for Judicial Conduct. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUcT (1990). Another proceeding that could potentially influence judicial decision-making
involves the Attorney General instituting a criminal prosecution against a sitting judge. See gener-
ally Reid H. Weingarten, Judicial Misconduct: A View from the Department of Justice, 76 Ky.
LJ. 799, 800 (1988) (discussing the procedures for investigating, prosecuting and trying a federal
judge). This mechanism is significant to the impeachment process only in that Congress may ex-
pect cooperation from the Department of Justice in the latter proceeding. Id. at 808 (discussing
Congress' power to compel the Department of Justice to turn over the evidence).
61. 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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alternative means of removal indicates that the impeachment process will re-
main a meaningful constitutional safeguard to federal judicial independence.'
D. Jurisdiction
1. Textual Directive and Other Sources of Authority
The Constitution defines the parameters of the Supreme Court's ability to
preside over certain types of cases. Specifically, Article ll vests the judicial
power of the United States in the Supreme Court and such other federal courts
as Congress may create.67 This provision mandates that the Court shall have
original jurisdiction over all cases involving Ambassadors, Public Ministers,
and Consuls, and those involving a State as a party.' In all other cases, the
Court has appellate jurisdiction as Congress sees fit.' To comprehend the
strength of congressional control over the judiciary, the issues underlying both
the Court's original and appellate jurisdiction must be addressed.
It is probable that the Framers of the Constitution intended that cases
arising under original jurisdiction comprise the majority of the Court's dock-
et.7" In practice, however, such cases constitute only a modest part of the
Court's case load.1 The awkwardness of gaining access to the Court may
produce this result. When a party seeks to obtain original jurisdiction, they file
a motion seeking leave to file a complaint.72 This requirement disregards the
implied rule in American jurisprudence that a court must hear all cases falling
within its jurisdiction.73 Indirectly, then, the Court limits its own original ju-
risdiction."
Within the above description of appellate jurisdiction, the legislature may
still encroach upon the judiciary's inherent independence." The Political Ac-
countability Doctrine supplies a limitation on the legislative branch. 6 This
canon mandates that Congress affirmatively address the "underlying policy
66. See TRIaE, supra note 50, at 64 n.7 (citing Kurland, supra note 22) (discussing the vari-
ous historical instances where Congress examined alternative means of removal).
67. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1; Mecham, supra note 10, at 639 (1995).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
69. Id.
70. Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's Management of
its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 187.
71. Id. at 187-88 (noting that as of 1993, the total number of original jurisdiction cases was
172).
72. Sup. CT. R. 17.
73. McKusick, supra note 70, at 188.
74. Id.
75. See infra Part IV. Congress has successfully limited the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction only once. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Despite this fact, Con-
gress has recently made several attempts to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See
Christopher T. Handman, The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court Jurisdic-
tion: Applying a New External Constraint to Congress's Exceptions Clause Power, 106 YALE LJ.
197 (1996) (discussing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's limitation on succes-
sive appeals of habeas corpus application to the Supreme Court).
76. This doctrine is rooted within the Exceptions Clause of the United States Constitution.
Handman, supra note 75, at 200 (stating that political accountability militates against Congress in-




concerns [of a legal action or issue] when it seeks to reduce the Court's juris-
diction." However, the doctrine only applies to laws that would otherwise
insulate an appeal from state actions. 8 The rationale is that Congress has al-
ready addressed the policy by refuting the specific act that is being legislated;
but where Congress allows the state to act, rather than prevents it from ad-
dressing a legal issue, this attention is not necessarily provided.79
Textually, though, the judiciary's jurisdiction is still limited. First, as dis-
cussed, Congress' substantial control over federal court jurisdiction potentially
undermines the very independence expressly appropriated to those judges. °
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that the Constitution grants Congress the authority
to create the lower federal courts and assign their appropriate jurisdiction.8
However, the Constitution does not require Congress to create inferior Article
III courts or to invest them with all of the jurisdiction allowable under the
Constitution.82 This is left to the discretion of Congress, again implying that
judicial autonomy, if it exists at all, does not endure in a vacuum.
A broader limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction is encompassed by the
doctrine of justiciability. Since its genesis in Marbury v. Madison,83 judicial
review has operated as the point of departure for all federal cases. For in-
stance, Article IH, section 2 directs that the federal judiciary may only hear
"cases or controversies. ' 's4 In other words, the judiciary has no authority to
exercise power beyond that traditionally considered to be judicial or accorded
to it by the Constitution.85
Furthermore, political questions are exempt from judicial consideration,s'
as are parties or disputes that do not satisfy the requirements of standing,87
mootness" or ripeness." From an interbranch conflict of interest perspec-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. In other words, when Congress allows the state to act without contending the under-
lying action, the issue has not been fully addressed, or even discussed at all.
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 29-44 (2d ed. 1990).
81. See generally, In re Application of County Collector, 96 F.3d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1996);
Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994).
82. Umanzor v. Lambert, 782 F.2d 1299, 1304 (5th Cir. 1986).
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (establishing judicial review over its sister
branches regarding actions conflicting with the Constitution).
84. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution ... to Controversies. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
85. Jordan Fried, Student Essay, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission:
An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 704, 714 (1989).
86. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that apportionment is not a political ques-
tion, and is therefore justiciable, as the issue includes an equal protection component as well).
87. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1981) (holding that "injury accords a basis for
standing only to 'those persons who are personally denied equal treatment' by the challenged
discriminatory conduct .. ").
88. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (discussing the mootness doctrine as pre-
venting courts from hearing cases when events subsequent to the institution of the lawsuit have
deprived the plaintiff of a stake in the action).
89. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947) ("A hypothetical threat is
not enough. We can only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants desire to en-
gage in or as to the contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstances of their
publication.... Should the courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their
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tive, these requirements ensure that judges will restrict themselves to solid
cases and not decide matters that belong with the political branches."
Stating that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is,"' Justice Marshall, nearly two centuries ago,
established the judiciary's final authority on matters of constitutional interpre-
tation. Although rthis holding is the cornerstone of judicial review, the judicia-
ry lacks the authority to enforce its decisions.' The judicial autonomy as es-
tablished by Marbury remains, but without much force.
Finally, just as the jurisdiction of the federal courts is determined by Con-
gress, the judiciary also depends upon the appropriation of money by the legis-
lature to conduct daily operations." This indirect restraint could potentially
thwart the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
2. Creation and Jurisdiction of Non-Article M Courts
Although it is not clear whether the Framers anticipated the creation of
non-article I judges at the drafting of the Constitution, over time the Legis-
lative branch assumed that authority. For instance, through authority vested in
Articles I and IV, legislative and territorial courts are empowered with the
responsibility to adjudicate particular disputes under the guise of defined pa-
rameters." This suggests that the Constitution granted to Congress the ability
to supplant the jurisdiction and independence of Article III courts. Specifically,
through the "Necessary and Proper Clause," the Constitution authorizes the
legislative branch to ensconce these non-article III tribunals.
However, these judges do not necessarily have the same authority as that
wielded by Article I courts. Neither bankruptcy judges nor magistrates re-
ceive authorization to try Article M cases directly from Congress. Rather, their
jurisdiction lies initially with the district courts who then transfer the case to
the auxiliary legislative courts." This transfer is mandatory under the Bank-
ruptcy Act!' and discretionary under the Magistrate Act."
jurisdcition ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues, they would become the organ of
political theories.")
90. Paul R. Verkull, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence,
30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 308 (1989).
91. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
92. For instance, the 1955 ruling of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), over-
turned the doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities, specifically in education, and generally, be-
tween races. However, the Supreme Court mandate was not enforced until the judiciary promul-
gated means and guidelines for implementation, requiring integration "with all deliberate
speed... "Brown, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
93. Mecham, supra note 10, at 640 (citing WIUU1AM H. REHNQULsT, 1994 YEAR-END RE-
PORT ON THE FED. JUDICIARY 1 (December 30, 1994)) (reviewing the payment of salaries of judi-
cial officers and employees, payment of jurors, and supplies made with funds appropriated by
Congress). Arguably, if Congress controls these purse strings, and reduces appropriations to the
judiciary, further docket restrictions could occur. This is not necessarily a "jurisdictional" issue in
the strict sense of the word, however, it could effect the number of grants of certiorari.
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress authority to establish bankruptcy
courts).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
96. Lucinda M. Finley, Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of
the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 560, 569 (1980).
97. 11 U.S.C.S. § 101 et seq. (1996) (providing that the bankruptcy courts "shall exercise all
[Vol. 74:2
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
In comparison, the plenary authority of Article IV specifically empowers
the Legislative branch to institute Territorial Courts." Therefore, in contrast
to the jurisdictional issues surrounding Article I courts, the judicial branch has
little license to argue encroachment by Article IV legislative courts. The Court
in, American Insurance Company v. 357 Bales of Cotton,t0 established that,
"[i]n the territories, cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of
Article I1 may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to
the limitations of that Article; courts, that is, having judges of limited ten-
ure."' 0'
Unfortunately, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy and territorial courts and
magistrates will inevitably encompass a broad range of Article El subject
matters, so these systems may threaten the framework of federalism and sepa-
ration of powers. Furthermore, as Justice Douglas so eloquently dissented, if
the standards and procedures employed by legislatively created courts do not
conform to Article III, this constitutes nothing more than "polite blackmail"
against the independent judiciary (Article Ell) as we know it."°
IV. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVE
Each method of limiting judicial independence has played an important
role in defining the powers of the judiciary. The limitations placed on this
article, however, compel an examination of a limited set of historical examples
where the sister branches have encroached on the judiciary. This section be-
gins with the 1787 constitutional debates, and sets the stage for a discussion of
the political climate as it affected the judges and their decisions.
Although one might imagine the Framers of the Constitution furiously
debating and refining federal judicial power, historical evidence proves the
contrary. Compared with discussion about the other branches of the federal
government, historical dialogue about the judiciary was scant at the Conven-
tion. 3 To illustrate, James Madison promoted separation of powers,'14 and
asserted that judicial review "makes the judiciary Department paramount in
of the jurisdiction [so] conferred").
98. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 631, 633, 636; 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994) (authorizing district judges to designate a magistrate to
exercise jurisdiction in any given case, provided the parties consent).
99. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This section provides "Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory.. . . "Id.
100. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
101. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day
Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 545 (1962)).
102. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 420 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Those
who hold the gun at the heads of Superior Court judges can retaliate against those who respect the
spirit of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment and who stand firmly against the an-
cient practice of using the third degree to get confessions and who fervently believe that the end
does not justify the means."). Id. at 422.
103. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 11 (citing Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 154
(1913)).
104. SCHWART, supra note 3, at 11. Specifically, Madison argued that it was "essential ...
that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers be separate ... [and] independent of each
other." Id. (alterations in original).
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fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be prop-
er.,"' Alexander Hamilton contested that the legitimacy of the judiciary ulti-
mately depends on the executive branch for the efficacy of its judgments.'"
These arguments though, were infrequent. Instead, the Framers focused
upon the powerful legislative and executive branches, and the relationship
between potential federalism issues."l This conclusion begs the question -
why did the founders of the American government fail to particularly define
the parameters of judicial power?
The Framers' indifference is best explained by a reflection on the pre-
constitutional American courts. The evolution of the judicial system in the
American Colonies fared no differently than that of England during King
James' reign. At the very most, little separation existed between the courts and
the general public's business." The same individuals who promulgated and
enforced laws also adjudicated cases.'" These seemingly draconian proce-
dures originated not from governmental oppression, but rather from early
colonists' survival needs. The small population, coupled with the demand for
military order to combat the violent ways of the earlier settlers, commanded
strict discipline and quick justice."' However, as the colonies were settled in
both population and organization, their respective governments established
complex court systems."'
These colonial courts resembled contemporary English courts. As England
introduced a new policy of constructive imperialism, supplanting charter colo-
nies with royal governments, the colonial courts contemplated a semblance of
their English counterparts." 2 For example, England controlled the colonial
judiciary by initiating an appellate process. If the dispute involved more than
three hundred pounds of sterling, the litigants had a right to appeal to Lon-
don."3 Ultimately, the rising tide of the revolution altered this similarity be-
tween the court systems.
Although Americans relied on their rights as Englishmen throughout the
Revolutionary War,"4 they did not articulate their rights as Americans until
adopting a written document."' Prior to the ratification of the Constitution,
intellectuals toyed with the idea that the judiciary had held independent power
to make void the laws passed by the sovereign."6 Indeed, even before the
105. Id. at 12.
106. THE FaDELisT No. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864).
107. See ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 25; Mario Perez-Reilly & Vile, supra note 32, at 198.
108. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 37 (2d ed. 1985).
109. Id. at 37-38.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 38, 45. Although a few of these courts structurally resembled our present courts,
some of the colonies established exceptional courts. Id. For instance, certain communities in Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts appointed "common peacemakers" and "judicious men" to hear dis-
putes within the community. Id.
112. Id. at 48.
113. d at 49.





adoption of the Constitution, state courts recognized judicial independence."7
Specifically, the states of New Jersey, Virginia, and Rhode Island determined
that certain statutes were invalid under their respective state constitutions." 8
When ratified, though, the United States Constitution failed to define the
parameters of the federal judiciary's independence. As drafted, the text of
Article II provided scant authority for judicial review of the other branches. It
was not until the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison"9 that the Su-
preme Court established this authority. This power was limited to situations of
conflict between the Constitution and legislative statutes or executive deci-
sions. Nonetheless, Marbury generally established that the judicial branch,
through the Supreme Court, was the final arbiter and interpreter of the United
States Constitution. 2 In this same era, the Supreme Court again extended its
jurisdiction, holding that Article ImI grants the Court the power of appellate
review over all cases involving federal law, including state court decisions
concerning federal questions."
The Court's expanded jurisdiction was not the only test this young nation
experienced at the turn of the eighteenth century. An attempt to impeach Jus-
tice Samuel Chase was one of Congress' most direct attacks on the judiciary.
Historical evidence indicates that Congress initiated the impeachment for polit-
ical purposes only; rather than for the purpose intended by the Constitu-
tion." In fact, John Quincy Adams wrote that Justice Chase's attempted im-
peachment was the initial step in a plan to eradicate the entire Supreme
Court. " Ultimately, a narrow majority of Senators decided not to impeach,
contending that only judges could effectively secure their life, liberty and
property.
24
As the American population expanded, the nation continued to establish
courts. While eastern judges and lawyers filled the courtrooms, territorial
courts further departed from their predecessors. In a leading case determining
the powers of territorial courts," Justice Marshall concluded that they had
jurisdiction over federal question cases. 26 However, because the judges of
these courts had limited tenures and did not hold office for a term of good
117. Id. at 7-8.
118. 1d. at 7-9 (citing the following unreported decisions: Holmes v. Walton (1780), Com-
monwealth v. Caton (1782), and Trevett v. Weeden (1786)).
119. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
120. Id.
121. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Stet.) 304 (1816).
122. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 57. Article Il of the Constitution provides that Judges shall
hold their offices during good behavior. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1. Furthermore, federal judges may
only be impeached for treason, bribery and other high crimes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
123. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 57.
124. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 58 (citing ADAMS, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE FIRsT ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275 (1903)). Ultimately,
Justice Chase retained his office.
125. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (establishing the
jurisdiction of the Florida territorial courts). For a discussion of this case, see William Baskerville
Hamilton, Anglo-American Law on the Frontier: Thomas Rodney & His Territorial Cases, 105
(1953).
126. American Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 511.
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behavior, they were not "federal" in nature, nor governed by Article In.'"
Although this issue seems archaic, federal court adjudication over Article IV
courts is still prevalent.'"
The Civil War inspired unique problems involving judicial independence.
The federal government, concerned with those judges who supported the Con-
federacy, contemplated impeachment at least once."2 Congress removed
Judge West H. Humphreys for abandoning his post to work for the Confeder-
acy.'O Such events demonstrate that a hostile political climate provides little
protection for judicial autonomy.
From the end of the Civil War until the Great Depression our tripartite
system of government refined itself further. Arguably, the most significant
decision of this period was Ex Parte McCardle,"' in which the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution, rather than Congressional mandates, estab-
lished the Court's appellate jurisdiction;"' however, the Court recognized
that Congress possessed the power to limit or expand that jurisdiction. 33 Lat-
er, Congress exercised its jurisdictional power over the lower courts by eradi-
cating the Commerce Courts in the second decade of the twentieth centu-
ry.
134
Although the events of the twentieth century have impacted judicial auton-
omy, there is little doubt that the judiciary has made strong advances. Franklin
D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan, for example, remains notorious. During the
early 1930s, President Roosevelt persistently attempted to pass legislative pro-
grams to lead America through the Great Depression. Responding to a deci-
sion labeling New Deal legislation unconstitutional, the President developed a
plan to increase his influence on the highest court." Roosevelt's proposed
scheme would have allowed the President to appoint one justice for every
justice on the Court over the age of seventy."3 Since many of the Justices at
the time fit this description, President Roosevelt would have been able to ap-
point six new Supreme Court Justices.' Obviously, the plan would have
produced a Court more deferential to New Deal legislation. Fortunately, the
Senate Judiciary Committee rejected Roosevelt's plan."3
Although the plan was never realized, these political rumblings charted a
different course for Supreme Court decisions regarding New Deal legisla-
tion.'" The court-packing plan did not alter the Court's perspective of New
127. Id. at 546.
128. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing jurisdiction of territorial
courts).
129. Grimes, supra note 43, at 1213-14.
130. ld.
131. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
132. Id. at 512-13.
133. Id. at 512-14.
134. Kurland, supra note 22, at 683-87 (providing an excellent historical source regarding the
abolition of the Commerce Courts).
135. ScHwAR1z, supra note 3, at 232-33.
136. Id. at 233.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 234.
139. Id. Within a few years, several opinions reflected this changing attitude. See West Coast
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Deal policies; rather, its changing political ideals added a different position for
the fate of America. For instance, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish'40 Jus-
tice Roberts provided the "switch in time that saved nine," defending his ideo-
logical shift because the Court sought to overrule precedent rather than "distin-
guish" as usual.4
This "switch in time" addresses another interesting issue. Even though a
President might succeed in appointing the judge of his or her choice, the latter,
by virtue of the appointment, does not necessarily mirror the political views of
the President. Long after the political forces leading to their appointment have
scattered, justices remain on the bench." Thus, the rationale for the
President's choice dies long before the judge retires. Consequently, Presiden-
tial expectations often lead to disappointment.
For instance, President Eisenhower once remarked that appointing Earl
Warren to the Court was one of his worst mistakes.'43 In conversation with
Warren, Eisenhower had apparently concluded that they shared similar politi-
cal ideologies.'" Thus, Eisenhower appointed Warren in the mistaken belief
that he was an Eisenhower Republican.'" No one sensed Warren's progres-
sive spirit,'" but by 1956 it was clear that he "was in the process of provid-
ing leadership for a libertarian-activist approach to public law and personal
rights ....
Today, the Presidential power of judicial appointment remains controver-
sial. One of the most unique Presidential appointments was that of Robert
Bork." Some commentators argue that the most interesting aspect of Bork's
appointment process lies within the questions asked and answered.'" In con-
trast to the nomination of Justice Clarence Thomas, which arguably focused on
the traditional question of fitness of office,'" the Bork proceedings focused
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law during the political
court- packing plan controversy), United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (de-
claring Congressional act regulating interstate commerce of milk constitutional).
140. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
141. Id. Justice Roberts was the switch vote in the West Coast opinion that allegedly caused
the "switch in time that saved nine." GEOFFREY R. STONE EL AL, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 215
(1996).
142. For example, by 1985 four of President Nixon's appointments to the United States Su-
preme Court remained on the bench. TRIM, supra note 31, at xvi-xvii (1985).
143. Stephen J. Wermiel, The Nomination of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower's Mistake? A Look
at the Historical Record, 11 CONST. COMMENT 515, 535-36 (1994-95).
144. ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 255.
145. 1d at 258.
146. 1d.
147. Id.
148. Frank Guliuzza, l et al., Character, Competency, and Constitutionalism: Did the Bork
Nomination Represent a Fundamental Shift in Confirmation Criteria?, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 27 409
(1992) (stating that no other judicial appointment had so much media attention, interest group
participation, and the same range of questions asked).
149. Id. at 421 (observing that Bork's hearings "opened the door for intensive screening of
candidate's ideological beliefs"); Carter, supra note 28, at 774-75 (stating that the Senate and the
American public chose not to accept Bork's originalist views).
150. Anton Bell, Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21 N.C. CENT. LJ. 194, 206-07
(1995) (describing the testimony of Anita Hill as creating a media frenzy and an uproar in the
nation, and how Thomas failed to give a definitive answer regarding his view on the right to abor-
tion); Estelle B. Freedman, The Manipulation of History at the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S.
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on his originalist constitutional interpretation."'
Although one might surmise that Bork's rejection was rooted in his per-
sonal ideology and interpretation, statistical evidence shows the contrary.
52
Specifically, one commentator suggested that 92.6% of the Senate questions
proffered to Bork regarded constitutional issues.'53 However, Justices Mar-
shall (95.4%), Rehnquist (92.6%), O'Connor (90.8%), Stewart (84.9%), and
Kennedy (83.5%) were appointed to the court and endured the same type of
questioning in nearly the same proportion as Bork.1
4
CONCLUSION
Current legal events reflect traditional inter-branch tensions that have
existed since the birth of our nation. The recent impeachments of three judg-
es-Hastings, Nixon and Clairborne' 5 -indicate Congress' reluctance to part
with traditional methods of control over the judicial branch. As we near the
end of the twentieth century, our federal courts listen to issues of greater con-
sequence to America's political system and public dialogue,"5s as well as to
individual rights.'57 Arguably, judicial independence plays a greater role in
our society.'58 Voters ultimately determine the course of the nation, and such
a privilege entitles its citizens to define and determine the destiny of the feder-
al judiciary.
This liberty, like so many others, carries with it the responsibility to not
only understand and utilize its flexibility, but also to safeguard its existence.
As a dissenting Justice Douglas so eloquently expressed, the ideals of judicial
independence provide "the mucilage which holds majorities and minorities
together in the federal segment of our Nation, and make tolerable the existence
of nonconformists who do not walk to the beat of the Chief Drummer."' 59
Burkeley N. Riggs
Tamera D. Westerberg
CAL. L. REv. 1361, 1361-63 (1992) (comparing the Senate appointment hearings to historical inci-
dents of racial lynching). Apparently, Thomas took Bork's dilemma as a lesson.
151. Carter, supra note 28, at 774-75.
152. Guliuzza, et. al. supra note 148, at 427-28 (indicating that other nominees suffered at
least the same proportion of Constitutional questioning).
153. Id. at 427.
154. Id. at 429. Of course, it can be argued that none of these Justices have a political ideol-
ogy as radical as Robert Bork.
155. VOLcANSEK, supra note 42, at 1-2.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. CL 2097 (1995).
157. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2097.
158. Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE LJ. 681, 682 (1979).
159. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 419 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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